Abstract: Secret sharing scheme is becoming famous for increasing the security to access sensitive information for applications and resources that have to be protected by more than one person. It divides the secret key into shares, distributed to participants such that only subsets of participants can reconstruct the secret key. This paper adopts counting-based secret sharing scheme as a promising secret sharing technique presented recently. This counting-based method works on constructing shares by changing one or two 0-bits within the secret key to one at different locations for producing needed shares. The combination of selected shares is counting the ones in parallel to recover the secret key. This paper proposed improving the reliability of this counting-based secret sharing scheme by increasing the size of the secret key to 64-bits as realistically needed by most applications. The work also improved the security of the secret key affecting its shares by adjusting the generation algorithm to involve applicable statistical randomness tests from NIST 800-22 standard where any unreliable secret key is regenerated again whenever needed. The proposal is implemented and compared with the original scheme via Java platform modeling showing interesting practical remarks providing remarkable contributions.
Introduction
Technological advancement in information technologies, communication networks, databases, and multimedia have become the nerve of knowledge life, industrial, financials, health, and security. Given to the increasing demand for web applications and the continuous growth of a number of networks users involving Cloud computing, E-Government, E-Commerce, E-Business, online banking services, which all contain sensitive information, it may be vulnerable to theft or access by wrong persons or even destroyed by hackers or service providers as non-trusted agencies in many cases. Therefore, there is an urgent need for information security with its three main components: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) [1] .
Information security is a big challenge in recent years, during which security has become the significant aspect of protecting from all the threats. There are several techniques of information security which have been proposed to protect data from disclosure. Some of them focus on traditional encryption to data, which is based on mathematical concepts and special arithmetic operations [2] , while others focus on enhancing the confidentiality of the exchanged data by hiding the information in any cover media such as picture, sound, and text, known as steganography [3] . In fact, the security techniques, i.e. cryptography and steganography, focus on the phenomena that one person is in the controlling seat who is in charge of the secrecy of information [1] . However, the question is what happens when the encrypted or hidden data are corrupted, or the secret key is lost. It means that there is only security, but there is not reliability. Secret sharing considers solving this problem, as it allows to achieve high levels of confidentiality and reliability arbitrarily [4] . Secret sharing opened the computing filed for several interesting applications and resources which requires the security to be implemented by several participants, i.e., the security decision is shared among a set of participants.
In the beginning, the primary motivation behind the secret sharing was safeguarding cryptographic key from loss [5] . Losing a cryptographic key is an equal to data loss, as we cannot recover data without the encryption key. Keeping the cryptographic key at one location deos not depend on any physical or electronic problem, such as loss of key, system breakdown, sabotage or sudden death of persons who owns the secret key, etc. Losing the key leads to loss of data and may make access to the data impossible. Therefore, the storing of several key copies, i.e. distributing the cryptographic key in various sites, was the solution to increase the reliability of security access to systems. However, this distribution leads to decreasing confidentiality may be by making the status worst, causing main data to be in great risk to be lost, modified, destroyed, or leaking to wrong hands. Therefore, secret sharing considers solving this problem by achieving high level of confidentiality as well as reliability. Another motivation behind the secret sharing is the reduction of trust on a single person. The dominance of a specific authority avoids individual trusty by keeping the secret key by one person to control the secrecy of information alone [4] . Therefore, the secret sharing provides collective access to the confidential information by making the decision collectively and distributing the trust among many participants to further enhance the reliability and confidentiality.
To stress on the idea, the secret sharing is considered more needed in the areas that have highly sensitive information with big impact on decision making [6] . Accordingly, secret sharing can be seen via many examples in the real-life. It can be essential for opening the vault in central banks, nuclear missile launch control, voting systems, sensitive encryption keys, and considerable medical agreement. Each of these cases requires access to be collectively agreed upon the sensitive information and resources. So, there is a need for this secret key to be shared or distributed among a set of participants by asking them all or a subset to be available at the same time for proper access [1] .
Secret sharing scheme divides secret among a set of participants where that specified set of participants can reconstruct the secret. Therefore, the secret sharing scheme consists of two phases: the construction-distribution phase, and the secret-reconstruction phase. In the constructiondistribution phase, the secret sharing scheme allows a trusted dealer (Algorithm) to generate secret shares by making information related to the secret called shares, and then these shares are distributed among a set of the participants via secure channel where each participant holds one share [7] . In the secret-reconstruction phase, the access structure enables a qualified subset of participants to collaborate and reconstruct the secret by collecting their shares in a specific way [8] . Note that secret sharing scheme divides all participants into two sets: the set able to retrieve the secret called authorized set and another set unable to recover the secret called an unauthorized set [9] .
The secret key is considered very secure in secret sharing scheme. The system distributes the shares among users, n participants, where k or more of the participants (k ≤ n) can retrieve the secret key by combining their k shares. The authorized set k is a subset of n participants (k out of n), considering (n, k) as threshold of secret-sharing scheme. In the threshold scheme, an attacker cannot discover the secret key, except if he knows at least k shares; knowing less than k shares should not reveal any information about the secret key [8] . In the secret sharing scheme there are two main properties which must be provided for applicability of any secret sharing scheme known as recoverability and confidentiality as declared below.
-Recoverability: It is the ability to retrieve the secret by the authorized set of participants by combining their secret shares. -Confidentiality: It is the fact that no shares can lead to disclosure of information of the secret key, i.e. stopping any intruder attempt to recover the secret key by guessing from less than k shares. Threshold secret sharing scheme began in 1979 by Shamir [6] and Blakley [5] independently. Shamir's scheme depends on polynomial interpolation, while Blakley's scheme depends on the geometry. Since then many work attempts have been proposed to serve secret sharing schemes. Some of them handled problems improving Shamir [6] and Blakley [5] methods and some others innovated new techniques, all to achieve the same principle secret sharing scheme, i.e. by various methods, such as Kai Wang [10] ; Tassa [11] ; Herzberg [12] ; Komargodski [13] ; Bai [14] ; Blundo [15] ; Chi-Sung Laih, Tzonelih Hwang [16] , and lately Adnan Gutub et al. [1] . This research focuses on Adnan Gutub's novel approach of counting-based secret sharing working on constructing the shares by changing one or two 0-bits at different specific locations within the secret key for producing a new share. This counting-based secret sharing scheme have been studied due to its wide range of applicability to almost all applications as well as its simplicity and performance in its running. Hence, the combination of shares can be applied by parallel counting the ones within selected shares (k shares) to recover the secret key.
This counting-based secret sharing scheme simplicity and practicality come from the method low mathematical operations usage, i.e. when constructing shares until retrieving the secret key, as well as its achievement of reasonable level of security, as will be stressed upon later in this work. Accordingly, in this paper, we have proposed improving the reliability of the counting-based secret sharing scheme by increasing the size of the secret key to 64-bit and applying two statistical tests on the generated secret key checking randomness of the shares and secret key sequence. This strategy allows getting the optimal reliability of secret key and constructing its shares contributing to the improvement of the security system.
The main objectives of this reliable secret key generation study can be stated in three points.
-increasing the reliable secret key size to 64-bits to male it suitable for real-life applications. -testing the security of the reliable secret key as randomly generated via passing NIST RNG testing. -verifying whether the reliable secret key is able to serve the number of users being capable to produce enough trustworthy shares. The paper has been organized as follows. Section 2 covers the related works about secret sharing schemes. Section 3 presents specific background about the counting-based secret sharing scheme. We cover generating the shares and retrieving the secret key via clarification examples. Section 4 presents our proposal modeling the reliable secret key selection within counting-based secret sharing. Section 5 discusses comparisons and result analysis. The final section, Section 6, includes the conclusion and the recommendations of this study.
Related Work
In the literature, there are many researches who discussed Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes from several aspects. For example, Shamir's Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme is the first scheme for secret sharing proposed by Adi Shamir in 1979 [6] . It is based on Lagrange interpolation polynomial. To get (t, n) threshold scheme, D pick a random (t-1) degree polynomial q(×) = a0 + a1× + …… + at-1× t-1 in which a0 is the secret and , where p is a prime number. Dealer generates n shares Si = q(i)………. Sn = q(n) and then distribute them to the participants by channel secure. By selecting any subset t of those Sn values, we can construct the polynomial by Lagrange interpolation and recover the secret, but cannot calculate the secret with (t-1) participants. Shamir's threshold scheme has some features that makes it secure. The size of shares does not override the size of the secret key. Also, the scheme is to be expandable, i.e. when t is fixed, the shares can be dynamically deleted or added without impact on the other shares. The system can have some changes within the shares without alteration of the secret key as well as without needing to generatie new shares to the participants. Shamir's scheme is thought to be a hierarchical scheme, by which it can provide each participant with a various number of shares based on their importance inside the organization [6] .
In Blakley's scheme [5] , the system is dependent on geometry to achieve a (t, n) threshold, the secret is represented as a point P in the vector space , and n shares are distinct (t-1) dimensional hyperplanes that pass through this point p that contain the secret, where (t−1)-dimensional hyperplane is a set of form:{ ( ,…., ) | +… = } where ,…, and are arbitrary points of the field . The secret can be obtained by intersecting t hyperplanes at P, whereas fewer than t hyperplanes will intersect only in some subspace containing P. Thus fewer than t participants are able to recover the subspace, but cannot recover the secret correctly. In fact, Blakley's scheme is not preferred due to the fact that unauthorized group of participants may know partial information of the subspace containing the secret making them able to guess the secret. The scheme is then improved by Simmons [17] to make it acceptable using affine space instead of vector space. However, in multi-level organizations, there is the need to share secret among all the members of the organization in hierarchically structured groups, where members from different levels have varying powers and as such, they need to factor in the powers in sharing the information [18] . Sharing of information is based on a predetermined sequence of threshold requirements. Such thresholds require the presence of a member with a higher power to enhance the organization's secret, as in Tamir-Tassa's Hierarchical Secret Sharing in [11] . Tamir-Tassa's introduced the perfect secret sharing scheme to solve users' problem in their threshold secret sharing scheme, where the secret is shared among a group of users into their levels. This proposal uses polynomial derivatives to generate lesser shares for participants of lower levels, compared with Shamir's scheme in which the secret is represented as the free coefficient of some polynomial. Thus, the secret is reconstructed in this scheme by using Birkhoff interpolation as discussed to assign identities of the participants from the underlying finite field [11] .
Based on Herzberg et al. [12] , the proactive secret sharing scheme is a game changer in secret sharing. Traditionally secret sharing schemes relied on fixed shares. However, in long-lived and sensitive secrets, this approach is not sufficient, as attackers may gain access to enough shares to reach the set threshold before the life of the secret is over. A proactive scheme of secret sharing solves this situation by periodically renewing shares. This is done without changing the secret being protected. If an attacker has accessed to any portion of the shares using the old information, the information becomes useless as soon as an update is done. In this scheme, an attacker has limited time to break into k locations before an update occurs [12] .
Bai et al. [14] improved Shamir's single-secret sharing scheme to a multiple-secret sharing scheme using matrix projection. They proposed a proactive secret sharing scheme method to renew (n) secret shares periodically in a (k, n) threshold-based secret sharing scheme without changing the secret or reconstructing the secret to generating new shares. Also, he presented a distributed proactive secret sharing scheme for the matrix projection secret sharing scheme. Note that, his technique cannot reveal the secrets from (k) shares by adversaries when new mixed shares with past and present are updated (i.e., this method is protected against the passive attacks) [14] .
In Asmuth-Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme [19] , the scheme uses an ascending sequence for a set of pair wise co-prime positive integers (x0< x1< x2< ..<xn, where x0>K is a prime), are chosen such that:
. AsumuthBloom scheme works on chooses secret K as a random integer from x0, and then n shares are constructed as Si = (K + r * x0) mod xi, for all (1 ≤ i ≤ n) where r is a positive integer generated randomly such that K + r * x0 x0 . xk. Given k various shares S1; S2,… ,SK, the secret K is retrieved as K= S0 mod x0, , where x0 is the unique solution of the system of congruencies using Chinese remainder theorem CRT [19] .
A Fully Dynamic Secret Sharing Schemes was presented by Blundo et al [15] . They presented a study with different access structures and proposed that a dealer enables a particular set of users to reconstruct different secrets by sending the same broadcast message to all users. This approach is based fully on information-theoretic without any computational assumption, i.e. the security of the scheme is unconditional. Also, the model appears both the size of shares held by users and the size of the broadcast message based on the defined size of the secret.
Evolving Secret Sharing Dynamic Thresholds and Robustness presented by Komargodski et al. [13] depended on proposing an efficient scheme for secret sharing among an unlimited number of participants, where only subsets of (k) participants can recover the secret. They evolved their method to resolve the problem of an efficient scheme for the dynamic threshold access structure. The method considered the size of qualified groups increasing as the number of participants increases which showed how to translate any scheme for k-threshold into the scheme which is robust. This secret sharing system had security incompatibility such that its secret can be recovered even if some participants have incorrect shares [13] .
Overview on Counting-Based Secret Sharing Scheme
The counting-based secret sharing scheme works by generating all the possible shares from the secret key (SK) [1] . It is mainly using two methods, namely 1-bit and 2-bit methods, which both work in different styles. The generated shares can be denoted by A having the same size as the SK secret key. This scheme only chooses n shares as being useful, i.e., n out of A shares are found to be suitable, while the remaining shares should be ignored. It is important to consider these n shares from the beginning to correctly distribute them among participants in secure way by authentic channel or trusted dealer. Note that these applicable n of A shares are selected accurately to be combined with each other to reconstruct SK fulfilling the counting-base reconstruction strategy. However, in case one or more of n shares are absent or unavailable, SK cannot be regenerated. Thus, subset of k shares is to be assigned of n, where k≤ n is able to reconstruct SK. This counting-based secret sharing scheme can be classified as (n, k) threshold scheme. It is to be mentioned that the security of the system relies tremendously on the difficulty of reconstructing SK from shares found to be less than k [1] . This section will introduce the original two methods of shares generation, 1-bit and 2-bit methods, which are affecting the pool A consisting acceptable and unacceptable shares. Then, the secret key SK retrieval from secret shares will be briefly presented clarifying the counting-based secret sharing approach. A clarification example is provided to elaborate the idea covering different cases of real applicable scenarios.
Generating Shares via 1-Bit Method
Secret shares generating via the 1-bit method depend mainly on the zero bits within SK. This 1-bit method generates all possible A shares based on the number of zeros found within SK, i.e. shares cannot be more than the number of zeros. This method works on selecting one zero from a specific position of SK and then flipping it to one to produce a valid share. Note that every time in generating the new shares, we must select the different location not previously chosen for producing another share and so forth.
The following example clarifies the 1-bit method to generate shares, where we proposed a simple example of SK= [1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0] as presented in Table 1 . Note that in this example, SK has 5 zeros, so it generates five shares by changing one zero at a time, as in highlighted cells in Table  1 . This method is considered simple to implement, fast to run, confirmed as reliable, and all shares are useful when performing the combination in parallel, but it has a drawback where it gives a limited number of shares produced. 
The 2-bit method is a modification to increase the numbers of shares generation described by means of the 1-bit method. The 2-bit method can be used alone or as an extension with the 1-bit method to increase the numbers of shares. This 2-bit method depends on changing two zeros within SK to generate extra possible shares. The method scans SK for zeros, whenever two zeros are found, they can be flipped providing a probable share to be used. Not all generated 2-bit shares can be useful since some that are generated do not fulfilling the counting-based secret key SK reconstruction strategy.
For our example of SK= [1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0] , we can flip the first zero with second zero to generate a new share as shown in Table 2 . Similarly, we can flipp the first zero with third zero to generate more new shares and so on. These applicable 2-bits shares are used in addition to the 1-bits shares for generating all the possible shares A within SK. Table 2 illustrates a modified example of Table 1 showing extra shares of 6 to15 added over the 1-bit method as an extension. The number of shares generated by this 2-bit method is 10, i.e. by flipping two different zeros every time within different positions. Therefore, the total shares generated by combining the two methods for SK= [1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0] are 15 shares, A=15 shares. Note that the 2-bit method enhances the 1-bit method and increases the number of shares produced for SK. However, not all these A shares are useful. It is found that many shares are not suitable to reconstruct SK, this factor forces us to verify the validity of needs A to generate n suitable shares. So, n out of A shares are to pass the testing to reconstruct SK before using them to ensure the applicability before distributing among the participants. 
Secret Key Retrieval from Secret Shares
As discussed before, the counting-based secret sharing scheme cannot use all A shares to recover SK. Only selected n shares are to be reliable and acceptable for distribution to participants. Therefore, n shares need to be tested to make sure of their validity before their usage as set of authorized participants shares, i.e. good to retrieve SK. Nevertheless, in case that one or more of participant's shares are found absent, SK cannot be recovered. Consequently, a subset of n which is used as prerequisite to reconstruct SK must be provided as k shares. This subset k is less than or equal to n (k ≤ n) and preserving the same condition of it cannot recover SK if the shares are less than k inputted. After determining n shares and making sure of their validity, the application defines a value of k out of n to be used as threshold of available true users' shares in parallel for SK regeneration. Accordingly, the k shares are mapped in parallel within the system and the parallel bits are counted. If the counting output from shares parallel combination for all bits in any column equals the value of k or more, then the resulted bit is one otherwise the resulted bit is zero, and so on. These resulted bits are combined and compared with original SK, i.e. to check the validity of the shares for SK secret key reconstruction. The reader is referred to a study [1] for more in-depth elaboration on the philosophy behind this counting-based secret sharing scheme.
Clarification Examples
The following examples focus on the counting based secret sharing idea and its SK secret key proper generation. The examples illustrate different cases for utilization of shares to clarify SK retrieval method and possible challenges to be addressed. The example is made simple with the same 8-bits SK size used in Table 1 for clarification purpose. The research will show a real-life application using 64-bits key as studied later. Recall SK= [1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0] as introduced in Table 1 and the shares generated by 1-bit and 2-bit methods exist in Table 2 assuming the number of selected shares to be given to users as n=8, as follows:
Case 1: Situation of Combining Shares = k
In this case, it is assumed that k=4 and the number of shares = k. This case is considered valid. Thus, the shares are combined as in Table 3 . Consider the counting result row which counts the ones within every column. SK reconstruction is performed by assigning value one whenever counting column result ≥k, otherwise a zero is placed in that location. Thus, the retrieved outcome of the combination process equals hexadecimal value 92 which is correct as SK=92.
Case 2: Situation of Combining Shares > k.
In this case, it is assumed that k=4, and the number of shares is greater than k. Thus, this case is considered valid even if the number of shares is more than k. The shares are combined with the condition that the counting result of bits is greater than or equal to k, as in Table 4 . Note, in this case, the number of shares is more than k. So, if the counting result of bits in one column ≥ k, then it gives one, otherwise, zero is placed in that location. Thus, the hexadecimal outcome of the combination process is 92, i.e. as needed SK=92.
Case 3: Situation of Combining Shares < k.
In this case, assuming k=4, and a number of shares is less than k, thus it is considered unable to retrieve SK. As needed, it cannot recover the SK secret key as the number of shares be less than k, as in Table 5 . Note that in this case, the number of shares is less than k. Thus, the outcome of the combination process is 00 ≠ SK=92, which is exactly as required.
Case 4: Situation of Involving Intruder False Share
Assume an intruder inserts a false share in the same scenario of Case 1, i.e. k=4, and a number of shares = k, but one of the shares (or more) is falsely inserted by an intruder, as in Table 6 . This case is depicted to be invalid, where all the shares are valid except the false one marked as FSh of hexadecimal value 89. Thus, the outcome of the combination process is 80 ≠ SK=92, confirming the system security validity.
Assume the same case of intruder inserting false shares but more than one, namely FSh1 and FSh2, as in Table 7 . These two false shares involvement result in invalid SK as needed. Thus the outcome of the combination process is found to be 00 ≠ SK=92 that verifies the scheme security strength.
The Proposed Reliable Secret Key Selection
This paper is proposed to improve the original countingbased secret sharing scheme though increasing the reliability of the secret key selection process. The aim is to increase the shares space applying the method on secret key of size SK 64-bits compared to the original scheme of small SK as for clarifying the idea of counting-based secret sharing. The original method depends on the simple variant sizes of SK, i.e. SK=4-bits, SK=5-bits, SK=6-bits, SK=8bits, and SK=12-bits. These sizes are not realistic to be used in real-life applications. So, we proposed to study the SK binary format of 64-bits allowing the scheme to be adopted in reality password numbers, such as: SK=
Recall the principle phenomena of SK secret key in counting-based secret sharing scheme to be unknown to all participants. Only the system dealer (Algorithm) is to know the SK secret key. This means that the SK secret key sequence should be random and preferred impossible to be guessed or predicted. This difficulty of guessing the random secret key sequence by intruders is the main block assuring secrecy of the system. So, the system dealer (Algorithm) generates SK secret key with its size 64-bit using Random Number Generators (RNGs), i.e. to produce pseudo-random SK secret key. Therefore, we assume an RNG is used at the beginning to provide SK followed by security verification before producing the shares, as algorithm flow graph shown in Figure 1 . The SK secret key generated by RNG needs to be verified to be realistic. This SK sequence should be random and possible to provide number of shares enough for the users, which is a process needed before selecting the shares by the 1-bit and 2-bits methods. To check the randomness of SK in this proposed scheme, we will rely on applying two statistical standard tests from NIST 800-22 suites to test the randomness of SK. The aim is getting a reliable random SK secret key. This proposed method introduced the new reliable counting-based secret sharing scheme, as depicted in Figure 1 .
In this new approach, we tested the modified algorithm using an Intel processor Core i7 PC with speed 2.90 GHz, RAM 16 GB, 64-bit operating system. Also, we depended on NetBeans IDE platform version 8.9 as our programming environment for simulating of the counting-based secret sharing scheme via Java language platform. This platform is used for simulating the two RNG tests of NIST 800- 22 
Generating Reliable Random Secret Key
Random numbers are basically known as sequence of numbers that are almost unpredictable in nature. It is assumed to be generated through Random number generator (RNG) which provide random sequence of numbers having no particular order or pattern to form them [20] . In the literature, there are two basic types of random number generators used to produce random sequences, True Random Number Generator (TRNG), Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) [21] .
True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
TRNG is an electronic piece that plugs into a computer and produces random numbers from a physical process, rather than computer programs [21] . TRNG uses a nondeterministic source (i.e., the entropy source) to produce randomness and often depends on measuring the unpredictable process of microscopic phenomena that generate random noise signals, such as thermal noise, atmospheric noise, the photoelectric effect, the quantum effects in a semiconductor, etc. The outputs of these random processes are assumed completely unpredictable, it may be used directly as a random number or may be supplied as a seed into a pseudo-random generator (PRNG). In fact, the generation of high-quality random numbers is considered unrealistic, too much time-consuming, making TRNG undesirable when a large quantity of random numbers is needed. So the research always recommends to use pseudorandom number generators to generate large number of random numbers [22] .
4.1.2
Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) PRNG is an algorithm used to produce a sequence of numbers which it is not truly random, but its properties are closer to the properties of sequences of random numbers [22] . PRNG depends on an initial value, called a seed to generate multiple pseudo-random numbers. This seed should be random and unpredictable. So the pseudo-random numbers of a PRNG are deterministic, i.e., all true randomness is confined to seed generation. The pseudorandom numbers are periodicity which is a desirable feature for several applications, like simulations of stochastic processes, statistical sampling and performance assessment of computer algorithms and Monte Carlo simulation. PRNG is important in several fields for its speed in random number generation compared to TRNGs which are comparatively slow [23] .
In this proposed scheme, we depended on PRNG function from Java program to generate the pseudo-random number for SK. This Java program provides support to generate random numbers primarily through (java.util.Random classes) [24] . The random function will generate a set of random bits based on the required 64-bits range intended as reliable size of SK. Therefore, these pseudo-random numbers of secret keys that are produced by the random function are subject to statistical tests verification which aim to emphasize the randomness of the secret key sequence. Reliable SK is then used to construct shares via the 1-bit and 2-bit methods, i.e. based on the number of zeros existed as shown earlier in Fig 1. 
Statistical RNG Tests
Statistical tests provide a mechanism for comparing and evaluating the sequence of bits as making standard decisions to determine the sequence randomness. The tests aim to try to verify that the random sequence of bits does not follow a definite pattern or specific order and it cannot be described as a probabilistic property [21] . There are a large number of probable statistical tests, each of them is evaluating the existence or non-existence of a pattern by a certain way. If RNG testing outcomes is found acceptable, then it will indicate that the sequence is applicably random to be accepted [25] . Statistical tests are formulated to test a specific null hypothesis (H0). In this paper, the null hypothesis indicates that SK sequence is being tested as random. If this case is not achieved, the hypothesis requests an alternative hypothesis (Ha) as set, which indicates that SK sequence is non-random. When any statistical test is applied, a decision or conclusion is obtained that accepts or rejects the null hypothesis, i.e. whether the generated SK is considered acceptably random or not. The possible outcome of the statistical hypothesis testing, either accept H0 assuming the secret key is random, or reject H0 asking for the secret key to be regenerated again. This rejected decision is called Type I error.
The possibility of Type I error is usually called the level of significance of the test denoted as α. That means α is the probability that the test will reference the SK sequence as non-random when it indeed is random. The reason may be that SK sequence holds non-random properties even when being the generator as pretended reliably good.
The statistic test is used to compute a P-value that determines the force of the evidence against the null hypothesis. Hence, P-value is the probability that RNG would have generated SK sequence less random than the sequence tested. If a P-value for a test converges to 1, then SK sequence seems to be perfect close to applicable randomness. Otherwise, if P-value test indicates value near zero, then SK sequence seems to be completely non-random. To be realistic, the system needs to decide an acceptable range for P-value to consider SK randomness acceptable, which is decided by significance level α. This significance level α is our realistic threshold that can determine the realistic tests within the range [0.01 or 0.001]. If (P-value ≥ α), we consider the null hypothesis as accepted, i.e., SK sequence assumed to be random. If (P-value < α), we conclude that the null hypothesis is rejected and α indicates the probability of Type I error, i.e., SK sequence seems to be non-random. We decided to accept 1% as the level of significance α, so the test specified in this study needs 0.01 minimum to be accepted. This made the reality acceptance rate to be of 1 SK from 100 SK, which insured reliable security. The system is tuned to only allow for a P-value ≥ 0.01, pretending the secret key would be considered random (reliable) with a confidence of 99.9%. Accordingly, we chose two applicable NIST 800-22 standard tests, namely the frequency (Monobit) test and the frequency test within a block, to determine whether SK is reliable in terms of randomness [21] , as introduced next. In fact, the reason to choose these two tests is to emphasize considering all the bits (frequency Monobit test) as well as portions of blocks (frequency test within a block) having reliable number of ones and zeros. For this case, the number of zeros within SK shouldn't be much more than the number of ones, where it can be observed clearly through previous elaboration shares example of Table 2 . On the other hand, as the number of ones increases within SK, the number of shares generated reduces and makes a different contradicting variable, which may lead to unacceptable reliability identifying SK as invalid to be used, too.
Our work selected the applicable two tests for verifying randomness of SK which have been implemented within the proposed system providing reliable remarks.
Frequency (Monobit) Test
The Frequency (Monobit) test focuses on testing the proportion of ones and zeros for the entire sequence of the SK secret key. This test works on determining whether the numbers of ones and zeros in a sequence are nearly equal. In fact, all tests within NIST 800-22 standard depend on the passing of this Monobit test, i.e., the success of this test gives reliability evidence for the existence of randomness in the SK secret key sequence and allows for possible success of the other test. If this test fails, the generated SK is rejected, as shown in Figure 1. 
4.2.2
Frequency Test within a Block Frequency test within a block is sub-derived from the previous Monobit test to further stress on security reliability. This test asks for diving the sequence (SK) into M-bit blocks. The focus then, becomes on the proportion of ones within this M-bit blocks. It works on determining whether the frequency of ones in any block is approximately M/2, nominating the sequence of the secret key in accepted reliability randomness. It is assumed as for the reason to choose Frequency Test within a Block to give homogenous distribution closer to equal among ones and zeros within SK to insure its fairness. This test checks for cases where any part of SK is containing more number of ones or zeros than the others. Therefore, failing this test makes the probability of guessing SK from generated shares high and then leads to low reliability.
These two tests are ready tools libraries provided by NIST. We applied them within our modified secret sharing procedure aiming to calculate the P-value, i.e. to determine randomness and then to enable us to acquire the reliable secret key. To summarize, if P-value ≥ 0.01 then SK indicates that the sequence is reliably random and the SK secret key is valid to use for constructing shares. Otherwise, the secret key is not-secure to use and the algorithm ( Figure  1 ) asks for new SK to be generated.
Comparison and Analysis
The proposed reliable counting-based secret sharing system is implemented via Java platform. This model results are analyzed at each stage to verify its contribution. We show remarks of the statistical tests applied to SK to acquire reliability within the secret key in order to proceed further within the process (Figure 1 ) to construct the shares. We studied the proportion of ones and zeros in SK based on the statistical tests to determine preferred SK secret key to be used. Therefore, our analytical study has been based on random samples of SK, which are generated by Random Function within our Java program generating series of pseudo-random bits, as observed in Table 8 . These pseudorandom samples of SK have been subjected to the two statistical tests from NIST 800-22 suites, i.e. the frequency (Monobit) test and the frequency test within a block, in order to experiment their randomness. We simulated these two tests applied on the samples to get the P-value per SK which determines whether the sequence for SK is random or non-random, then sorted them as presented in Table 8 . To simplify readability, Table 8 random SKs have been listed from SK1 to SK63 as providing reliable randomness, while the non-random samples of SKs, generated by the same Java Random Function, have been sorted as SK64 to SK100 to prove possible non-random results. and zeros in a sequence are to be verified closer to equal. So, this test results in Table 8 compute the absolute value of the sum of ones and zeros Sn within SK sequence. Where, ones represented for +1 and zeros for -1, and then the resulting absolute value of the sum of ones and zeros in SK is divided by the square root of the size of SK sequence of 64 bits.
Then, we will get on the test statistic value Sobs= . As mentioned earlier, the level of significance α determined in Frequency (Monobit) test is 0.01. Accordingly, the computation of P-value through erfc (denoting to the complementary error function), gives P-value = erfc ( ).
Accepting H0 if the P-value ≥ α then SK would be considered reliably random. This test has been applied to the 100 sample of SK, where p-value has been calculated per SK based on the proportion of ones and zeros in the entire SK sequence. When the number of ones and zeros is close to equal, they will cancel each other. Thus that test statistic result will be almost 0 and the P-value will be equal to one. That means that this SK is perfectly random based on this test and valid to use as the reliable secret key in the countingbased secret sharing scheme.
In fact, the counting-based secret sharing scheme depends on the number of zeros within the secret key to construct secret shares. Since the proposed SK size in counting-based secret sharing scheme is 64 bit, then the equal point in this test between ones and zeros within SK sequence is 32, and the P-value indicates to 1. It means that the SK which contains 32 zeros, will be perfectly random and reliable. The population of testing P-values of SKs can be shown in Figure  2 below.
Figure 2. P-value Distribution of Randomness Applying
Monobit Frequency Test
Consider Figure 3 , observing the random samples of secret keys passed the frequency test, i.e. having p-value > 0.01, we will determine the reliable random secret key as valid to use in counting-based secret sharing scheme. In Figure 3 , we have assumed that if P-value ≥ 0.8, i.e. when the number of zeros within SK equals 31, 32 & 33, then the random secret key has a high level of reliability to be used, as the case in (sk1, sk7, sk9, sk10, sk11, sk13, sk18, sk24, sk26, sk29, sk32, sk39, sk41, sk49, sk50, sk51, sk52, sk53, sk56, sk57, sk58, sk60, sk61& sk63). Similarly, if the P-value < 0.2, as the number of zeros within SK equals 26, 25, 24, 23, 40,39 & 38, then the secret keys hold a low level of reliability and are not advisable to be used, as the case in (sk17, sk20, sk22, sk23, sk25& sk38). As for, the remaining of secret keys in which Pvalues are range between 0.8 and 0.2 they hold a medium level of reliability and can be used.
Selecting Reliable SK Based on Frequency Test
within a Block Frequency test within block focuses on the proportion of ones within M-bit blocks, and through determining whether the frequency of ones in an M-bit block approaching of M/2 until as would be the secret key is accepted as randomness. This test works on partitioning SK sequence into N= [ ] non-overlapping blocks, where n indicates the length of SK and m the number of bits within a block. Any unused bits are discarded. In this frequency test within a block, the null hypothesis H0 defines that SK sequence is random. The alternative hypothesis Ha is SK sequence that is non-random. Test statistic χ 2 computes the proportion πi of ones in each block, i.e., the number of ones within the block is divided by m. The test statistic χ 2 is represented in the equation: .
Recall the level of significance α as determined before in this study to be as 0.01. Accordingly, we can compute the Pvalue through IGAMC (denoting to Incomplete Gamma Function), where P-value = IGAMC (N/2, χ 2 /2). Accordingly, accepting H0 if the P-value ≥ α then SK would be considered random. Reject H0 if the P-value < α then SK would be considered non-random. The testing P-values of SKs can be shown in Figure 4 below. Figure 4 results generated are from testing the 100 samples of SKs, where SK length is 64-bit (n=64), and the number of bits within a block is 8-bit (M=8). Observe that all the points that represent acceptable SKs, i.e. from SK1 to SK63 (Table   8 ), are located above the level of significance α (i.e., all pvalues ≥ 0.01). Hence, these secret keys considered are random. That means accepting the null hypothesis H0 is that SK is random. Through Figure 4 , there are many SKs that have not overridden the frequency test within a block, as listed in Table 8 which are (sk64, sk65, sk68, sk69, sk70, sk71, sk72, sk73, sk74, sk75, sk76, sk77, sk78, sk79, sk80, sk81, sk83, sk84, sk85, sk86, sk88, sk89, sk90, sk94, sk96, sk100). That means that these SK secret keys are not-random (i.e., all p-values < 0.01). Consequently, the null hypothesis H0 is rejected and Ha hypothesis is accepted alternative as that the SK is nonrandom. Note that, some of SKs have overridden the test as in Table 8 , i.e. (sk66, sk67, sk82, sk87, sk91, sk92, sk93, sk95, sk97, sk98& sk99). These SKs appear to have acceptable randomness while not passing the Monobit test, due to the reason of holding some of random properties when divided into small blocks. Figure 5 represents random samples of SKs which passed the frequency test within a block having p-value ≥ 0.01. These samples determine the reliable random SK secret key valid to use in counting-based secret sharing scheme. The test represents great importance to get on distributing the bits to be ones and zeros within SK as closer to equal percentages. Figure 5 also shows SKs for different higher P-value ≥0.8. The secret key has a high level of reliability as common case in (sk2, sk6, sk8, sk11, sk27, sk31, sk34, sk39, sk47, sk50, sk51, sk54, sk57, sk61, sk62& sk62). Controversially, if the P-value ≤ 0.2, for secret key holding low level of reliability is not advisable to use, as the case in (sk3, sk15, sk16, sk20, sk23, sk29, sk32, sk41, sk42 & sk45). Acceptable usage can be for the remaining Pvalues range between 0.8 and 0.2 holding medium level of reliability.
Figure 5. Random Secret Keys Reliability Based on Frequency Test within Block

Practical Reliable Secret Key Selection
The randomness frequency tests alone are not enough for SK practicality. The tests are limited to compute the proportion of ones and zeros within SK sequence which tends to converge. Therefore, having SK with passing statistical test values, i.e., P-value ≈1, can lack the optimal distribution of ones and zeros within the sequence, i.e. degrading the optimal reliability. It can be observed as part of SK containing more number of ones or zeros than other parts. Accordingly, higher P-value is recommended to avoid this problem. We found that any SK passed both tests and having P-value for both tests greater than or equal to 0.8, i.e. P-value ≥ 0.8, considers the selection practically optimal for the reliable secret key, which is preferred to be used in the counting-based secret sharing scheme. Combining both tests within one graph can give proper indication. Consider Figure  6 , the F-test denotes Monobit frequency test and the F-Test within Block denotes the other frequency test within a block showing the SKs passing with high P-values, as the case in (sk11, sk39, sk50, sk51, sk57, sk61, sk63,) , where their P-value ≥ 0.8. These SKs above 0.8 can be considered preferred selection for the reliable secret key although they are found only 7% of the SK generated. Figure 6 show that some of SKs have achieved their Pvalue ≥ 0.8 in one test, but less in the other one and vice versa. Therefore, any SK passing 0.8 only with one test is not considered preferred optimal selection although considered reliable, as the case in (sk1, sk2, sk6, sk7, sk8, sk9, sk10, sk13,  sk18, sk24, sk26, sk27, sk29, sk31, sk32, sk34, sk41, sk47, sk52, sk53,  sk54, sk56, sk58, sk60, sk62) , representing 25% of the generated SKs. The low level of α = 0.2 or 0.1 (i.e. 0.1 < p-value < 0.2) is achieving low reliability of SK and preferably should not to be used although its percentage is 31%, which is homogenous to the non-reliable percentage of 37% nonpassing randomness making a challenge to generate preferred SK secret key sequences. 
Conclusion
In this work, we have increased reliability to improve the counting-based secret sharing scheme by increasing the size of the SK to 64-bits as being practical for real life applications. We improved the secret sharing algorithm by making the SK sequence generated and verified for randomness. It is believed that this secret key SK generation made intruders guessing difficult to succeed. The study focused on checking SK randomness to be reliable and further practically optimal. Therefore, the test depended on Java Random function generator to produce the pseudorandom sequence testing for 100 SK samples.
The randomness has been experimented applying two standard statistical tests from NIST 800-22 suites, Frequency (Monobit) test and Frequency test within a Block, showing interesting randomness features. However, it is found that the best random SK valid to use is when the number of zeros and ones within it are almost equal, i.e. approaching 32 for our study 64-bit SK size. Yet, the number of zeros tests are not enough alone to fully make the system reliable for secret key in the counting-based secret sharing scheme. It is possible to find SK containing 32-zeros but lack the optimal distribution of ones and zeros within the sequence, hence SK is commonly containing more number of ones or zeros in one part than another. This challenge justified applying the frequency test within a block further to the Monobit frequency test which helped getting more reliable random secret keys.
The reliability study is assumed to be the highest when SK achieves both frequency tests together with the significance level α = 0.8 (i.e., p-value ≥ 0.8); thus, we conclude that SK has high reliability and consider optimized the best to be used in the counting based secret sharing scheme to construct secret shares. The analysis and comparisons also considered different randomly generated SK samples showing medium and low reliability level interesting outcomes. The research determined two more levels of significance combing both reliability randomness tests showing high, medium, and low preference. The high reliability level sets the focus on significance α = 0.8 (i.e. p-value ≥ 0.8) which achieved limited 7% SKs, recommended as fully reliable to be used. The low level of α = 0.2 or less (i.e. 0.1 < p-value < 0.2) is achieving low reliability of SK and preferred not to be used although it's found in large numbers of SKs with percentage of 31%. The medium level of P-values ranges between 0.8 and 0.2 is holding reasonable reliability and can be considered as it is found 25% of the SK space.
Future work
We suggest recommendations to improve this paper in the future by increasing the size of SK to 128-bit. Also, we recommend applying other statistical tests from NIST 800-22 test suites on the random secret key, for getting on the optimal, reliable secret key to use in counting-based secret sharing scheme.
